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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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2. Congo: Hammarskjold sees Congo problem as in
"most hopeful" new phase. (*Page iii*)


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4. Nepal: Plans of exiled leader in India to oust King
Mahendra. (*Page iii*)

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Congo: [Secretary General Hammarskjold, noting signs of improved relations between the UN and the Kasavubu government, has characterized the Congo problem as in a "most hopeful" new phase. Commenting on the political difficulties besetting President Tshombé, Hammarskjold observed that the UN's task would be "keeping Kasavubu close and Tshombé low." He indicated that while Dayal would have to return to the Congo, he might shortly be removed by substituting a five-man commission for the post of senior UN representative.] *70*

The circumstances surrounding Tshombé's detention at Coquilhatville continue obscure, with spokesmen for the Leopoldville government denying that he is under arrest. Reports that Interior Minister Munongo has seized power in Katanga are unconfirmed. ([] (Backup, Page 4) (Map) []) 25X1 25X1

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Nepal: [Following recent conversations in New Delhi with Nehru and Defense Minister Menon, Nepali Congress party resistance leader Subarna Shumshere] [] OK

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[redacted] plans an "all-out" effort against King Mahendra in mid-June. Subarna, who has been in India since the King's takeover in Katmandu in December, recognizes that his plans are dependent on the success of his efforts during the coming month to obtain arms and additional financing. Nehru, who has been disturbed by the King's autocratic actions, reportedly again assured Subarna of his "sympathy," but the degree of support which New Delhi will give Subarna is at present unclear. [redacted] 25X1

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[redacted] Page 5)

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SELECTED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

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Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles. U.S.I.B. NIE 11-5-61.
25 April 1961. [redacted]

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Soviet Short-Term Intentions Regarding Berlin and Germany.
U.S.I.B. NIE 11-7-61. 25 April 1961. [redacted]

Possibility of Soviet Nuclear Testing During the Moratorium.
U.S.I.B. NIE 11-9-61. 25 April 1961. [redacted]

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The Situation in the Congo

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[HammarSKjold's characterization of the Congo as in a "most hopeful" phase stems in part from his satisfaction at the return of the UN to Matadi and at Tshombé's failing political fortunes. HammarSKjold expressed the belief that Kasavubu's ascendancy over Tshombé will improve prospects for agreement between Leopoldville and Stanleyville, adding that he had received confirmation of the existence of a military agreement between the Mobutu and Gizenga forces.]

[HammarSKjold's expressed optimism may be in part intended to prepare the way for a retreat on Dayal. When the intention to remove Dayal is communicated to Kasavubu, this should diminish the danger of demonstrations when Dayal returns to the Congo. It is not certain, however, whether Dayal's return to the Congo will be under sufficiently harmonious conditions to permit HammarSKjold to remove him without seeming to bow to Congolese pressure.]

The director of the Katanga Information Service has urged HammarSKjold to use his good offices to secure Tshombé's release from detention in Coquilhatville. He also asked the United States to make representations to HammarSKjold, urging that Tshombé's immediate release was required to prevent a coup in Katanga by "more intractable elements."

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Nepali Congress Exiles Planning Stepped-up Campaign Against King

[Following Nehru's initial public criticism of the King's actions in December, he appeared willing to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, maintaining normal relations with the King while affording the exiles a haven in India.]

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[Nehru's recent meetings with Subarna suggest that he may be moving toward more direct support of the Nepali Congress party. [] at their meeting early in April, Nehru interposed no obstacles to Subarna's plans to promote non-violent agitation from India. []

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[] suggests Nehru did not express disapproval of resort to violence as well. In addition, []

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[] Krishna Menon gave no indication he would keep Subarna from importing arms, although Menon refused any direct assistance. Subarna, who has long financed the Nepali Congress party, has been in touch with Socialist leaders abroad, and has already reportedly arranged an arms purchase from representatives of the Israeli Mapai party.]

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[There is little doubt that at this time only active Indian support would ensure the success of a Nepali Congress party effort to return to power. Unless there is a threat of a Communist takeover, however, New Delhi is unlikely to intervene directly as it did in 1950 when the Nepali Congress party overthrew the Rana oligarchy. The Indian leaders are more likely to encourage the exiles covertly while hoping that time, combined with Nepali Congress party agitation, will so erode the King's position that the need for active Indian intervention will be obviated.]

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